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The question of whether individual compensation should be available for breaches by the executive is a live one. Yet, one could be forgiven for assuming that as far back as 1703, in Ashby v White, Chief Justice Holt definitively resolved it:
‘If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a 
means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is 
injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is 
a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy for want 
of right and want of remedy are reciprocal…Where a new 
act of parliament is made for the benefit of the subject, if a 
man be hindered from the enjoyment of it, he shall have an 
action against such person who so obstructed him.’1
This article surveys four national and intra-national human 
rights instruments: the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms 1982 (the Canadian Charter); the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 (NZ BORA); the Victorian Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Victorian Charter); and the 
Australian Capital Territory Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT 
HRA), and examines their differing approaches to remedies 
for violations committed by the executive. Note, however, 
that this article focuses primarily on pecuniary compensation 
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the emergence of a rights consciousness in the second half of the 20th century, and its 
subsequent convergence into a proliferation of rights instruments across the world, belie 
an important distinction – the availability of damages for breach.
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as a personal remedy for breach, rather than other personal 
remedies such as declarative or injunctive relief, or broader 
constitutional remedies such as striking out or reading 
down of inconsistent legislative provisions. Damages are not 
always the best remedy for human rights violations but, as 
Lisa Tortell has demonstrated, money can serve important 
symbolic purposes providing clear vindication of rights 
and governmental admission of wrongdoing.2 As such, in 
appropriate circumstances, damages should be available and 
should be awarded.
thE Canadian Charter of rights and 
freedoms 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a 
constitutionally entrenched human rights instrument that 
guarantees an expansive list of fundamental freedoms. The 
Charter was borne partly out of frustration with an earlier 
legislative human rights framework, the 1960 Canadian Bill 
of Rights. This 1960 enactment was perceived to suffer two 
underlying flaws; first, as a federal statute it did not apply 
to provincial legislation, allowing the provinces to legislate 
contrary to the declared rights; and, second, as a simple, 
unentrenched Act of Parliament, the courts were wary of 
interpreting the provisions broadly.3
The court’s extreme deference to parliamentary sovereignty 
at the expense of an impotent Bill of Rights was most 
clearly seen in the Supreme Court’s decision of Attorney-
General of Canada v Lavell.4 This case concerned a provision 
under the Indian Act that revoked a woman’s status as an 
Indigenous person under the Act if she married a non-
Indigenous man but, significantly, did not have the same 
effect if an Indigenous man married a non-Indigenous 
woman. The claimants, Lavell and Bédard, argued that 
this (clearly discriminatory) section was in breach of s1(b) 
of the Canadian Bill of Rights, which guaranteed ‘equality 
before the law’. By 5-4, the Supreme Court adopted a 
very narrow approach to s1(b) and the Bill of Rights more 
generally, with the plurality holding that equality before 
the law means nothing more than ‘equality of treatment in 
the enforcement and application of the laws of Canada’.5 
Because this provision treated all women equally there was 
no discrimination. In a concurring judgment, Justice Pigeon 
went even further, reaffirming his belief that Parliament did 
not intend for the Bill of Rights to invalidate prior inconsistent 
legislation.6
Decisions such as Lavell provided impetus for a 
constitutionally entrenched and broadly interpreted Charter.7 
Most significant in this respect is the inclusion of an explicit 
restitutionary provision. Section 24(1) reads:
‘Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this 
Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a 
court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as 
the court considers appropriate and just in  
the circumstances.’
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The important words in this section are ‘such remedy as the 
court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances’. 
This phrase gives the court wide ambit to tailor particular 
orders to the appellant, ranging from declaratory relief, 
equitable injunctions and even pecuniary compensation. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court has held that the purpose 
behind s24(1) ‘is to provide responsive and effective 
remedies’, and as such it should be given a ‘generous and 
purposive interpretation’.8
The Charter was given perhaps its most generous and 
purposive interpretation in the 2010 case of City of Vancouver 
and the Province of British Columbia v Ward,9 a case that 
enshrined the right to pecuniary compensation for violations 
by the executive. In 2002, police arrested Alan Ward near the 
site of a public speech by then-prime minister, Jean Chrétien. 
Mr Ward was wrongly suspected of intending to throw a 
pie at the prime minister. He was strip-searched and his car 
impounded. Mr Ward sued, alleging breach of his right to 
be free from unreasonable search and seizure (guaranteed 
under s8 of the Charter). The trial judge agreed and awarded 
damages of $5,000 for the strip-search and $100 for the 
impounding of the car. This case eventually made its way 
to the Supreme Court, which overturned the $100 award 
but unanimously upheld the $5,000 compensation for the 
unreasonable strip-search. In determining whether damages 
were an appropriate remedy, the Court affirmed its earlier 
decision in Doucet-Boudreau. In that earlier case, a majority of 
the Court examined what constitutes an appropriate and just 
remedy under the Charter:
‘An appropriate and just remedy…is one that meaningfully 
vindicates the rights and freedoms of the claimants.’10
The wide scope given to the interpretation of the Charter 
reflects a realignment in attitudes towards parliamentary 
sovereignty and the role of the judiciary in Canada. The once 
all-powerful doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has been 
weakened by the emerging acceptance of judicial review as 
an appropriate and necessary bulwark for the protection of 
human rights. However, the acceptance that damages may be 
an appropriate remedy for breaches of human rights cannot 
simply be attributed to this broader theoretical realignment, 
but rather a simple truth: when the executive fails in its duty, 
pecuniary compensation may be necessary for vindication.
thE NEW ZEalaNd Bill of rights aCt
The NZ BORA came into force on 25 September 1990. 
Although it was modelled on the Canadian Charter, it differs 
in two significant respects; it does not contain any provisions 
providing for compensation or remedies for breaches of the 
Act, and it is not constitutionally entrenched. In this sense, 
it bears a striking resemblance to the 1960 Canadian Bill of 
Rights, rather than the 1982 Charter. Judicial interpretation, 
however, has given it a greater operation than its earlier 
Canadian cousin.
In 1985, the NZ government released a White Paper 
canvassing ideas for a Bill of Rights.11 This White Paper 
contained two noteworthy features: (1) a remedial provision 
modelled on s24(1) of the Canadian Charter; and (2) that 
the Bill would be enacted as ‘supreme law’.12 Clause 25, the 
remedial provision, read:
‘Anyone whose rights or freedoms as guaranteed by 
this Bill of Rights have been infringed or denied may 
apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such 
remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the 
circumstances.’
Academic commentary has noted that there was considerable 
opposition to the proposed Bill, although much of it focused 
on its proposed status as supreme law and its consequent 
weakening of parliamentary sovereignty, rather than its 
remedial provision.13 Nevertheless, its final passage through 
Parliament was assured only after clause 25 was excised 
and s4, which ensured its status as an ordinary statute, was 
added. Significantly, this means that the NZ courts cannot 
strike down legislation as inconsistent with rights enshrined 
under the Act, though they can (and often do) give statutes a 
generous reading so as to remain consistent with it.
The removal of clause 25 was presumed to negate any 
judicial activism. Indeed, the prime minister, Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer, reassured Parliament that the Bill ‘creates no 
new legal remedies for courts to grant. The judges will 
continue to have the same legal remedies as they have 
now, irrespective of whether the Bill of Rights is in issue.’14 
Palmer’s exhortations, however, have proven incorrect and 
the courts have significantly expanded the scope of the Act to 
provide personal remedies for executive violations. The most 
significant of these extensions occurred in Simpson v Attorney-
General, also known as Baigent’s Case.15 Although there had 
been judicial murmurings about the absence of remedies 
in earlier cases,16 in Baigent’s Case the Court of Appeal took 
the extraordinary step of simply introducing a right to 
compensation for breach.
Baigent’s Case concerned an action of trespass by the 
police. In the course of executing an arrest warrant against 
the premises of Troy O’Brien, the police arrived at a house 
owned by Mrs Baigent, a woman ‘who had no connection 
with Mr O’Brien’.17 Mrs Baigent’s son answered the door and 
when questioned, gave his identity to the detective. He also 
telephoned his sister (a Wellington barrister) who reiterated 
that the police had the wrong house. During this telephone 
conversation it was alleged that the detective had said to the 
sister, “We often get it wrong, but while we are here we will 
have a look around anyway.”18 Mrs Baigent commenced civil 
proceedings in the High Court against the attorney-general 
on a number of grounds, including violation of s21 of the 
NZ BORA, which reads; ‘everyone has the right to be secure 
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the person, 
property, or correspondence or otherwise’. The Master of the 
High Court struck out all claims (citing statutory immunities 
in relation to the s21 cause of action), and the High Court 
dismissed an application for judicial review. The Court of 
Appeal, however (New Zealand’s highest court in 1994), 
reversed the decisions and upheld Mrs Baigent’s appeal, 
remitting the matter to the High Court with an amended 
statement of claim.
The Court of Appeal judges reasoned that the fact that 
the NZ BORA did not contain an express clause about 
remedies was ‘probably not of much consequence’,19 nor an 
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‘impediment to the Court’s ability to “develop the possibilities 
of judicial remedy”’.20 Indeed, Justice Casey considered that ‘it 
would be wrong to conclude’ that the absence of a remedies 
provision demonstrated ‘that Parliament did not intend 
there to be any remedy for those whose rights have been 
infringed’.21 Justice McKay agreed, finding it:
‘[D]ifficult to comprehend…that Parliament should 
solemnly confer certain rights which are not intended to be 
enforceable either by prosecution or civil remedy, and can 
therefore be denied or infringed with impunity. Such a right 
would exist only in name, but it would be a misnomer to 
call it a right, as it would be without substance.’22
It is important to be clear here; Baigent’s Case has not 
established a principle that pecuniary compensation for 
breaches of the NZ BORA is available as of right. Rather, a 
claimant will be awarded damages only if the court finds that 
compensation is both an appropriate and effective remedy. 
Indeed, the primary reason that compensation was awarded 
in Baigent’s Case is because the usual remedy for violations of 
unreasonable search and seizure – the exclusion of evidence 
– was clearly inappropriate in the circumstances: Mrs Baigent 
faced no charges!23 This is strikingly similar to the Canadian 
decision of Ward, discussed above – interestingly, though, in 
both cases a declaration that the individual’s rights had been 
violated was considered by the courts to be insufficient: only 
pecuniary compensation could meaningfully vindicate the 
rights of the claimants.
thE ViCtorian Charter of human rights 
and responsiBilitiEs aNd thE australian 
Capital territory human rights aCt
In contrast to the Canadian Charter and the NZ BORA, 
the Australian jurisdictions’ human rights protections and 
personal remedial provisions are decidedly limited. Neither 
the Victorian Charter nor the ACT HRA permit compensation 
for violations of the recognised rights (excepting 
compensation for wrongful conviction under s23 of the 
ACT HRA) and, similar to the NZ BORA, neither legislative 
instrument is constitutionally entrenched, or provides courts 
with the power to strike down inconsistent legislation.
Both Acts are clear from the outset – pecuniary 
compensation will not be available. Under s40C of the ACT 
HRA, a victim of an alleged contravention may bring an 
action against the public authority in the Supreme Court. 
However, the Court’s remedial powers are constrained, 
governed by s40C(4): ‘the Supreme Court may, in a 
proceeding under subsection (2), grant the relief it considers 
appropriate except damages’. The Victorian Charter is no 
different. Section 39 governs individual legal proceedings 
arising from executive breaches. Subsection (3) explicitly 
rules out pecuniary compensation, providing that ‘a person 
is not entitled to be awarded any damages of a breach of 
this Charter’. Although judicial interpretation led to the 
introduction of pecuniary compensation for breach in both 
Canada and New Zealand, the clear words of the ACT HRA 
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and the Victorian Charter constrains judicial activism here to 
a much greater extent.
The reason for the restrictive approach towards damages 
(and judicial remedies more broadly) is a theoretical one – 
that is, rather than leaving responsibility for the protection 
of human rights to the judiciary alone, the major focus of 
the Victorian Charter and ACT HRA is preserving a balance 
between the legislature, executive and the judiciary.24 
Whether, in effect, a balance exists is another question.
The ACT HRA and the Victorian Charter conceptualise 
widespread rights consciousness and a well-developed 
rights-based dialogue across the legislature, public service 
and wider community more generally, as the best guarantee 
for the protection of human rights. In this regard, both the 
Victorian Charter and the ACT HRA require all Bills that come 
before Parliament to include a ‘statement of compatibility’ 
which clearly notes whether the Bill is consistent with human 
rights, and if not, how not.25 Significantly, however, failure 
to include a statement of compatibility does not affect the 
validity of the law.26 The weakness of this dialogue model is 
exemplified further by the interplay between ss31 and 32 of 
the Victorian Charter.
The relationship between ss31 and 32 illustrates the 
Charter’s extreme deference to parliamentary sovereignty. 
While s32 requires all courts, tribunals, public servants 
and others who interpret and apply the law, to interpret 
all legislation in a way consistent with human rights, s31 
permits the Victorian Parliament to ‘override’ the operation of 
the Charter by making an express declaration to that effect. 
Even though s31(4) states that it is Parliament’s intention 
that this override provision be used only in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’, it is not at all clear when a circumstance may 
be ‘exceptional’. The ACT HRA also includes a provision 
requiring that all Territory laws be interpreted ‘in a way that 
is compatible with human rights’.27 However, it does not 
include an override provision enabling the Parliament to 
actively ignore the enshrined rights.
Nevertheless, the explicit exclusion of the possibility for 
damages for breaches of human rights under the ACT HRA 
and Victorian Charter is curious, and raises the question: 
what is the function of damages? Damages are designed to 
compensate claimants, vindicate their rights and/or deter 
abusers. While declarative relief may often have the potential 
to achieve these aims, in certain circumstances it will neither 
be appropriate nor effective. Something stronger will be 
required. Pecuniary compensation, the ‘tangible confirmation 
of responsibility’28 is needed.
 
CoNClusioN
Human rights instruments throughout the world differ 
in their handling of pecuniary compensation for breach. 
This is curious. Whether society believes rights protection 
is best guaranteed by a balance between the legislature, 
executive and the judiciary; a strong sovereign parliament; 
or perhaps a weightier judiciary with powers to strike down 
inconsistent legislation, the question of the appropriateness 
of damages should be clear. Both the NZ Court of Appeal 
and the Canadian Supreme Court certainly agreed, and 
after a number of years they finally cast aside the timidity 
of their respective legislatures to ensure that, in appropriate 
circumstances, claimants may receive damages for violations 
of their rights. Declarative relief was not seen to go far 
enough. Indeed, in this respect it is worth remembering 
the words of President Cooke of the NZ Court of Appeal in 
Baigent’s Case:
‘It is necessary to be alert in NZ to the danger that both 
the courts and Parliament at times may give, or at least be 
asked to give, lip service to human rights in high-sounding 
language, but little or no real service in terms of actual 
decisions.’29
Australians should also be alert to this danger, and our 
legislatures should acknowledge that pecuniary 
compensation for breach of executive acts gives real service 
to claimants. The explicit exclusion of the availability of 
damages under the Victorian Charter and the ACT HRA is 
unfortunate. Surely anything that assists in the meaningful 
vindication of individual rights should not be shied away 
from?  
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